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A Case Study of the Effects of Public Opinion on
the Utilization of Law in a Conflict Resolution:
An Exemplification of Cahn's Sense of Injusticet
Harrell R. Rodgers, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION
Most modern research has concluded that the general public partici-
pates in such a small way and possesses so little specific knowledge of
political issues and events that those who govern are given very consid-
erable discretion. For example, Dahl observed that "politics is a side-
show in the great circus of life."1 Presthus pointed out: "It is well
known that individual participation in political affairs, beyond voting,
is limited to a small minority of the population." 2 Converse concluded
that "government officials, in those (few) situations where they recog-
nize public opinion, are prone to see it as 'an entity to be guided, not
to be guided by.' ", Wahlke makes a heavily documented argument
along this line, pointing out that, among other things, "few citizens
entertain interests that clearly represent 'policy demands' or 'policy ex-
pectations' or wishes and desires that are readily convertible into them",
"relatively few citizens communicate with their representatives," and
"citizens are not especially interested or informed about the policy-
making activities of their representatives as such." 4 Studies designed to
determine the impact of constituency attitudes on congressional voting
behavior have found that such influences seem to be important only in
limited policy areas.5
t This research was made possible by a grant from the National Science Foundation.
A more complete analysis of these data can he found in my Community Conflict, Public
Opinion and the Law (1969).
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Georgia.
1. R. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? 305 (1961).
2. R. PRESTHUS, MEN AT THE Top 281 (1964).
3. Quoted in Wahlke, "Public Policy and Representative Government: The Role of
the Represented," Prepared for the Seventh World Congress of the International Political
Science Association, Brussels, Belgium, September 20-30, 1967. Published by the LABORATORY
FOR POLITICAL RESEARCH 20 (1967).
4. Id. at 6-10.
5. Miller and Stokes, Constituency Influence in Congress, 57 AMERICAN PoLrrCAL
SCIENCE REvIEw 45-46 (1963); Cnuddle and McCrone, The Linkage Between Constituency
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It is the purpose of this paper to examine the impact of demands and
supports on one major decision rendered in a public dispute.6 The dis-
pute revolved around an Iowa law which required children 6 to 16 to
attend schools taught by state-certified teachers. The law itself is of a
common variety, but the people with whom it came into conflict rep-
resent one of the most unique cultural groups found in the United
States today. They are known as the Old Order Amish, the most con-
servative branch of the Amish religion. The Amish for a six year period
fastly refused to hire certified teachers for two private schools that they
operate in Buchanan county, located in East Iowa. Numerous attempts
were made to resolve the dispute. The Amish were pried by offers of
compromise, and coerced by jail sentences, attachment of personal
property, and even seizure of their school age children. Ultimately,
however, even though the local decision-makers had legal precedent on
their side,7 they decided not to enforce the law. This raises two ques-
tions: (1) What demands/supports did the local decision-makers per-
ceive in the dispute? (2) What impact did these perceived demands/
supports have on the decisions rendered as outputs in the dispute?
A state-wide poll in 1965 revealed that the general public of Iowa
was aware and concerned about the controversy and to a substantial
degree favorably disposed toward the religious group in their fight
against the state." In fact, only 14 per cent of the state-wide public fa-
vored "forcing the Amish to obey the law", while 46 per cent favored
"leaving them alone." In contrast, the local decision-makers (N = 12),
Attitudes and Congressional Voting Behavior, 60 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW,
66-72 (1966); Boynton, Southern Conservatism: Constituency Opinion and Congressional
Voting, 129 PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY, 259-69 (1965).
6. The theoretical framework for this study is standard systems analysis. System analysis
conceptualizes the political arena as an interrelated set of components subject to
environmental stimuli. Stimuli are transmitted to the political system by "inputs" of two
types, demands and suports. Demands call for action by political decision-makers, such
as the "output" of good or services. Supports are attitudes and behavior that buttress the
political system, and add to its stability. There are two types of support-specific and
diffuse. Specific support is generated by the gratification of specific individual demands,
such as when wanted goods and services are provided. Diffuse support is a reservoir of
good will that an individual has toward a political system. Diffuse support allows the
political system to survive during periods when outputs do not satisfy inputs of demand.
See D. EASTON, A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL LIFE (1965).
7. United States v. Kissinger, 250 F.2d 940 (3rd Cir. 1958); People v. Pierson, 176
N.Y.2d 201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903); Knox v. O'Brien, 7 N.J. Super., 72 A.2d 389 (1950); State
v. Hershberger, 150 N.E.2d 671 (Ohio 1958); Gingerich v. State. 83 N.E.2d 47 (Ind. 1948);
Commonwealth v. Beiler, 168 Pa. Super. 462, 79 A.2d 134 (1951); State v. Hershberger, 103
Ohio App. 188, 144 N.E.2d 693 (1955); Chalpin v. Glick, 172 Ohio St. 249, 175 N.E.2d
68 (1961).
8. The survey was conducted by the Iowa Poll, a professional polling staff of the
Des Moines Register. The questions were constructed by the author who would like to
thank Mr. Glenn Roberts of the Iowa Poll for including the questions for me. The
figures can be found in my COMMUNITY CONFLICT, PUBLIC OPINION, AND Ti4E LAW (1969).
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a group identified by the decision-makers as opinion-leaders (N = 17),
and a random sample (N = 289) of the non-Amish population of the
school district in which the dispute was taking place were interviewed
in October, 1967, and each group still overwhelmingly favored enforce-
ment of the law against the Amish. The local decision-makers consisted
of ten individuals who served on the School Board during the dispute,
the Superintendent of Schools, and the County Attorney. As Table I
shows, all twelve of the decision-makers thought the law should have
been enforced, even though they made the final determination not to
enforce the law. Thirteen of the opinion-leaders said "the Amish should
Decision-Makers Opinion-Leaders Local Citizens
1. They should obey
the law like every-
one else. 12 100 13 76.5 187 64.7
2. Leave them alone. 3 17.6 53 18.3
3. The Amish should
gain certification of
their own teachers. 5 1.8
4. The state should
provide them with
certified eachers. 1 5.9 2 0.7
5. More negotiation
and compromise. 1 0.3
6. D.K. 41 14.2
total 12 100% 17 100% 289 100%
TABLE 1
How THE DECISION-MAKERS, OPINION-LEADERS AND
LocAL CrrIzENs WANTED THE AMISH DIsPuTE SETTLED
be made to obey the law", 3 said "leave them alone", and 1 said that
"the state should provide them with certified teachers". Sixty-five per
cent (N = 187) of the local citizens said "the Amish should be made to
obey the law", as opposed to 21 per cent (N = 61) who suggested some-
thing other than enforcement (18% of this 21% simply said "the Amish
should be left alone"). Fourteen per cent (N = 41) of the local citizens
could give no answer.
DEMANDS AND SUPPORTS PERCEIVED BY THE DECISION-MAKERS
To determine what part of these attitudes were actually communi-
cated to the decision-makers we began by asking the local citizens and
opinion-leaders the following question: "At any time during the dispute
did you ever get in touch with any local officials about how you thought
the dispute should be handled?" Of the 289 local citizens only 18 (6%)
answered this question affirmatively. Most of these individuals (N = 14)
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stated that they talked to members of the school board and/or the school
superintendent. The decision-makers were asked if the local citizens
sought to communicate their thoughts concerning the dispute to them
and without exception they stated that the local citizens gave them over-
whelming support. When probed, most of the decision-makers admit-
ted that very seldom did a local citizen make a special effort to seek
them out and communicate their thoughts. Mostly they said the topic
came up in informal or casual meetings. Interestingly enough, there
was some support for an argument made by Professors Jewell and Pat-
terson "that high concern of representatives for their constituency is
plausible in spite of the fact the legislators have low saliency in con-
stituents' eyes." Five of the decision-makers stated that they were con-
cerned about how the local citizens felt toward the dispute and so they
purposely sought the opinions of the local citizens. One decision-maker
put it this way:
At several points in the dispute the whole United States seemed to
be against us, so naturally we were concerned with how the local
people felt. Several of us sounded them out and they supported us
without reservation. We never really doubted they did. You just
know how the people feel. It isn't scientific, its the result of living
around these people all your life. You know what they are think-
ing.
Another decision-maker answered:
It should be clearly understood that with few exceptions, the peo-
ple of the School District supported the board and administration
completely. In fact, most of the calls and comments from local cit-
izens were to the effect that we were being too lenient and too con-
servative in dealing with the Amish. One citizen (a respected man
who has several times been an unsuccessful candidate for the school
board) threatened to file a Writ of Mandamus against the board to
force us to file charges against the Amish and jail them. His attor-
ney advised him to let it rest.
The decision-makers were also asked if they felt that the local citi-
zens supported them consistently to the end of the dispute. Each an-
swered affirmatively.
The opinion-leaders, as one might expect, stated that they discussed
the dispute with the decision-makers in a much higher ratio than the
local citizens. Only one of the 17 opinion-leaders stated that he never
9. M. JEWELL AND S. PATTERSON, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES 351-52
(1966).
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discussed the matter with any of the decision-makers. This opinion-
leader was a very distinguished individual who held a local political
post. He was not a member of the business elite who represented the
average opinion-leader.'0 Although there was some overlap, most of the
opinion-leaders stated that they had discussed the matter with the de-
cision-maker(s) who had identified them as an opinion-leader (although
they were not always aware of who identified them). The opinion-lead-
ers also stated that they discussed the matter with the decision-makers
usually in an informal manner, primarily during off-work hours. This
was natural, since they usually moved in the same social circles. If an
opinion-leader and a decision-maker would not normally meet in their
day-to-day endeavors, then normally they did not discuss the problem.
The decision-makers also made it clear that they realized the support
of the opinion-leaders and knew this support to be consistent.
Another obvious locus of support for the decision-makers came from
the local communication media. The area newspapers and radio sta-
tions were openly in support of the school board. The president of the
radio station in Oelwein was named by three decision-makers as an
opinion-leader, and he was mayor pro-tem of the city of Oelwein.
Earlier we noted that the majority of the state-wide public outside
the local community opposed enforcement of the law. The crucial ques-
tion is: how obvious were these attitudes to the decision-makers? The
answer quite simply is that they could not help but be very aware that
outside reaction was negative. The public made themselves known
through letters specifically addressed to individual decision-makers,
open letters to the board, and even in some cases by phone. If a deci-
sion-maker held a position which made him obvious in the dispute
(such as president of the school board, school superintendent, or county
attorney) then he received more letters and phone calls. Several of the
board members stated that they never received a letter specifically ad-
dressed to themselves, but did read open letters sent to the board and
passed around by the members. The persons who filled the three posi-
tions mentioned above received as many as two hundred letters.
The letters received seem to have been the topic of a great deal of
discussion among the decision-makers. As one decision-maker said: "At
least one effect of the letters was to allow me to draw some conclusions
about people who write letters." His reference was that a good many of
10. There is evidence that this individual was chosen because the decision-makers felt
that his position in the community demanded it. He was not privy to the decisions-
makers at all. See N. POLSBY, COMMUNITY POWER AND POLITICAL THEORY 50 (1963).
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them seem to be badly disturbed. Another decision-maker described the
typical letter "as probably a tension-releasing device for the letter writer
little related to the dispute."" One decision-maker provided an exam-
ple of the type of letter he received:
One . . . was from a 14 year old girl who quoted several biblical
passages, none of which had any application I could see to the
Amish, and warned us that if we continued to "persecute the
Amish," who she said were God's chosen people, we would all be
eternally damned.
Most of the letters opposed the decision-makers' position and showed
little, if any, specific understanding of the dispute.
The newspapers outside of the local area gave the dispute consider-
able attention, as did state radio and television stations. The dispute
was even national news at one point, and attracted Huntley-Brinkley
to the area. The decision-makers viewed this coverage as primarily
negative and felt that the newspapers played a substantial role in turn-
ing the general public against them. 12 Time and again the decision-
makers stated that the newspapers sensationalized the dispute for the
purpose of increasing their circulation. The topic inevitably came up
in opinion-leader interviews and many of them were particularly upset
by what they considered extremely biased news coverage. One business-
man pungently expressed himself by exclaiming that "if those [unmen-
tionables] from the press can make it through the pearly gates, anybody
can." One of the decision-makers expressed a more compassionate at-
titude when he said "the newspapers never really seemed to understand
that they were playing with the lives and future of considerable num-
bers of persons."
Nor could the decision-makers help but be aware of pressure from
state officials. In the early stages of the dispute the state refused to take
an interest, even though several of the decision-makers appealed to
them for advice and aid. Only when the dispute was on the verge of
becoming a state-wide political issue did Governor Harold E. Hughes
and Attorney General Lawrence F. Scalise take an active interest. Scal-
ise tried to serve as mediator late in the dispute, but failed miserably.
He was highly sympathetic to the Amish and tried to convince the
11. This condusion has some basis in empirical findings. See R. LANE, POLITICAL LIFE:
WHY PEOPLE GET INVOLVED IN POLITICS 108-11 (1962).
12. The respondents almost always equated the term "newspapers" with the two
largest newspapers in the state-the Des Moines Register and the Cedar Rapids Gazette.
However, some respondents were aware that many newspapers in the state, especially the
smaller ones, were on their side.
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School Board to give in to them. At one point he traveled to the com-
munity and appealed to the School Board and an audience of local cit-
izens to let the Amish go their own way. The audience did not receive
him sympathetically and when one of the decision-makers would make
a point in rebuttal the partisan audience would cheer heavily in sup-
port. The incident served to harden Scalise's pro-Amish attitude and
severely handicap communications between his office and the board.
Several of the decision-makers felt the whole incident was regrettable.
When the Governor did get involved there was really nothing the de-
cision-makers could do but let him have his way because ultimate legal
authority rested in the powers of his office. The Governor's sentiments
toward the dispute could not be considered wholly directed in favor of
the Amish. It was obvious that he found them difficult to reason with,
but the Governor did realize that a solution had to be found to the dis-
pute before it cast a stigma on his administration. If this meant that
the Amish got off the hook, that is the way it would have to be.
Another source of demands/supports was, of course, the Amish them-
selves. There is every reason to believe that the 15 Amish families in-
volved in the dispute were not altogether unanimous in their stand on
the school issue. One of the 15 Amish fathers made it quite clear to me
that he did not really feel very strongly about the school question, but
that his wife did and he felt he had to go along with the others. He
stated that although there were a few people among the families who
felt the way he did, most were certain that Dan Borntrager was right.
The decision-makers were aware of these small chinks in the Amish ar-
mor (several of them directed me to the particular Amishman), but
they were also aware that the rest of the Amish would do as Borntrager
said. "Realistically," one decision-maker said, "we have to look at the
Amish as being unified. They have a patriarchal society and Dan is the
patriarch."
Most of the other Amish families in the area who were not involved
in the dispute tended to play only the role of silent sympathizer with
the other Amish. A few tried to assist them by making an effort to get
various local non-Amish persons to help support the Amish cause. One
opinion-leader and several decision-makers received letters from Amish-
men beseeching aid for their brethren's cause. The letters were usually
on simple scraps of paper or on a page from their children's tablet, the
words badly misspelled, and printed with pencil in very large symbols.
In general, one would have guessed that they came from first-graders.
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One of these letters sent to an opinion-leader read: "Hve you ben read-
ing the paper. You better leave the Amish be or your town will be
wrund." "Crude," said the opinion-leader, "but straight to the point."
The perceived decision-making environment in over-simplified form
can be summarized by Figure 1. The decision-makers were aware of
demands and supports from a variety of sources. They perceived sup-
port from a majority of the local citizens, opinion-leaders, and local
communication media. The decision-makers perceived opposition from
a majority of the state-wide public, state officials, outside communica-
tion media, and the Amish themselves.
FIGURE 1
THE PERCEIVED DECISION-MAKING ENVIRONMENT
Support Opposition
Local Citizen General Public
Local Opinion-Leaders State Officials
Local Communication Media Decision-Makers Outside Communication Media
Amish
We are now prepared to survey the impact of the perceived de-
mands and supports on the actions rendered as outputs by the deci-
sion-makers.
We began simply by asking the decision-makers if they felt that
their own decisions in the dispute had been affected by the negative
reaction of the majority of the general public outside of the commu-
nity. Only one decision-maker answered affirmatively. The other
eleven were quite explicit in stating that they were not influenced by
outside opinion because "those people did not really understand the
dispute anyway." In addition they stated that they "were not running
a popularity contest", "were trying to uphold the law as their office
demanded", and "do the right thing". These phrases were used time
and again. The eleven decision-makers were then asked: "In other
words, outside reaction really played no role in the dispute?" None of
the eleven would agree with this. As one decision-maker said: "My
own decisions in the dispute were not affected by outside reaction but
it certainly altered the dispute." Each of the decision-makers seemed
to be aware of one or more consequences of outside public opinion.
The consequences they cited were of three distinct types: (1) The
Amish who were quite aware of outside support, were encouraged by
it to hold out until they won; (2) the outside reaction brought finan-
cial and legal aid to the Amish and thereby enabled them to remain
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adamant and do things they would not have been able to do if left to
their own resources; and (3) the outside reaction eventually created a
political crisis and caused state political leaders who normally would
not have been interested to become involved. Still this does not an-
swer the question of why the law was not utilized.
THE FAILURE TO UTILIZE THE LAW
The decision-makers were asked the following question: "I seem to
remember that in the early stages of the dispute an attempt was made
to reach a settlement through the courts. The law seemed to be on your
side, so why did you abandon the effort?" Up to three responses were
coded for each respondent. All of the answers except one fell into one
of the three following categories: (1) The law couldn't be enforced
(N = 5); (2) trying to enforce the law was not getting us any place
(N = 5); and (3) the law was too unpopular with the public (N - 8).
One decision-maker felt that the effort to enforce the law through the
courts was never abandoned. Individual attempts were, he conceded,
but each time one type of attempt failed another type was tried. This,
of course, does not explain the abandoning of one attempt and the
search for a new method.
Along the same line the decision-makers were asked: "Legally every-
thing was on your side. Yet you couldn't reach a settlement through
the courts. Would you say the law in this case was useless?" Nine of
the decision-makers answered yes. Three, however, were perceptive
enough to say "No, it was our own reluctance to enforce the law."
This, of course, is the key to the fact that the law was not enforced
-the decision-makers were reluctant to enforce it. The fact that "en-
forcement of the law was too unpopular" was mentioned eight times
demonstrates that public opinion affected the decisions of the decision-
makers a great deal more than they were willing to believe or admit.
Even the statements that "the law couldn't be enforced", or "trying
to enforce the law wasn't getting any place" reveal that the decision-
makers were simply not convinced that enforcement of the law was
best, or even just. The law definitely could have been enforced had
the decision-makers really wanted to go all out in doing so.
It is well to examine what enforcement of the law would have meant.
As long as the Amish refused to give in, one or more of three forms
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of action could have been taken. First, the Amish fathers could have
been jailed. Since they were in civil contempt they would have been
imprisoned until they decided to comply. Second, substantial amounts
of the Amish property could have been garnisheed and sold at public
auction to pay their fines. Finally, the Amish could have been driven
from the state. Any of these alternatives would have been very harsh,
and the decision-makers were aware of this. Several decision-makers
stated that the legal alternatives seemed harsh in relation to the in-
fraction. As one decision-maker put it, "they hadn't stolen anything
or hurt anyone physically, but the legal solutions seemed better suited
for that type of crime." Enforcement of the law lacked what Edmond
Cahn has called "desert."' 13 "The law," says Cahn, "is regarded as an
implement for giving men what they deserve, balancing awards and
punishments in the scale of merit."' 4 If the law cannot perform this
function it will not be considered "just."
As one considers some of the efforts to enforce the law the principle
of desert becomes more obvious. Early in the dispute several of the
Amish fathers were jailed. Incarceration had little effect, however, be-
cause the Amish simply went to jail, and sat the time out. The chil-
dren were still not in school, and the breadwinner had been taken
away from the family. It was non-violent protest superbly applied and
the type of futile situation which simply served to provoke sympathy
for the Amish. Had the dispute concerned a different type of people
(especially an extremely unpopular group), enforcement of the law
might have turned out to be a functional solution. The Amish reputa-
tion for being simple, hard working, honest, and religious, however,
certainly persuaded many that they should not be treated in this man-
ner. As one opinion-leader said: "Can you imagine one of those guys
[Amishmen] being in jail with a bunch of crooks." Another said: "Jail-
ing an Amishman is like beating a chained dog."
All of this points very clearly to the validity of Cahn's conclusion
that if law lacks desert (among other things) it cannot be accepted as
just. The lack of desert invokes what Cahn calls the sense of injustice
on the part of society.
It denotes that sympathetic reaction of outrage, horror, shock, re-
sentment, and anger, those affections of the viscera and abnormal
13. E. CAHN, THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE 16 (1949).
14. Id.
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secretions of the adrenals that prepare the human animal to resist
attack. Nature has thus equipped all men to regard injustice to
another as personal aggression. 15
The decision-makers' alternative of seizing Amish property might
have proved a more feasible solution had it not been for the late date
at which the alternative was utilized. By the time it was employed,
sympathy outside of the local community was heavily behind the Amish
and they received financial support which saved them from losing their
property. The decision-makers thus found that their efforts to apply
the two most logical legal weapons were abortive. This left the deci-
sion-makers with only the alternative of forcefully seizing the Amish
children and taking them to public school. This proved to be the step
that converted the dispute into a political crisis, for which there was
no available legal solution.
One final query produced overwhelming support for the conclusion
that the greatest obstacle to enforcing the law was the decision-makers'
own reluctance to do so. The question posed was this: "If the public
had supported you all the way, would the law have been enforced?"
All 12 of the decision-makers answered in the affirmative. Even if the
legal alternative had been harsh, if public support had favored such
a solution, the law would have been enforced. This reasoning is easy
to follow. The law might be harsh, but if the public backs the law one
must pay the price if he chooses to break it. This might be clearer if
stated a different way. If the public had favored enforcement, the deci-
sion-makers could have rationalized enforcement because they would
not have visualized enforcement as a matter of discretion. The law
could have been enforced and the decision-makers would not have felt
a personal responsibility for the consequences. But with public opinion
badly divided the decision-makers were faced with accepting personal
responsibility for choosing to go all out and enforce the law. Here
their conscience prevailed.
One last reason why the law was not used that we have mentioned
but not expanded upon merits further comment. Once the dispute be-
came national news it also became a state political crisis, and a legal
solution was out of the question. No legal alternative existed which
would get Governor Hughes and the Democratic party off the hook.
It was a perfect example of the system finding it necessary to respond
to political demands (both actual and potential) and process a new
15. Id. at 24.
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solution to alleviate stress in the political environment. The process
takes place by adjustment through what Easton calls "feedback." Feed-
back is the information link between the political system and its en-
vironment. Through feedback the political system can adjust to actual
or potential crisis or stress. Without feedback, Easton says "the system
would find itself utterly exposed to the vagaries of chance."' 16 Hughes
and his administration had too much political acumen to take chances.
The demands were obvious, and the anticipated consequences of ig-
noring these demands were too ominous a risk to take.
SOME CONCLUSIONS AND SOME GENERALIZATIONS
We have shown that the decision-makers were sensitive to demands/
supports from a wide variety of sources, and that the determination
of the decision-makers to enforce the law depended in part on the de-
mands and supports of these groups. However, outside opposition alone
probably would not have kept the decision-makers from enforcing the
law. Non-enforcement was the product of several things: (1) The deci-
sion-makers perceived disparities between the infraction involved in the
case, and the punishment (the law lacked desert); (2) this led the deci-
sion-makers to be somewhat reluctant to enforce the law; (3) their
reluctance was reinforced by the fact that since public opinion was
badly divided over the issue, if they enforced the law they would have
to assume personal responsibility for the results; and (4) in its latter
stages the dispute no longer resembled a legal problem.
At this point we can formulate a few generalizations concerning the
conditions under which law is realistically available for conflict resolu-
tion which might be tested in future research: 17
1. Public support plays a considerable role in the effectiveness of
laws. In this study we found that the law could not effectively
be applied to the Amish because of public opposition. Another
well-known study found a similar relationship concerning
drunk driving offenses, game laws, liquor laws, and gambling
laws.' 8
16. D. EASTON, A SYSTEM ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL LIFE 367 (1965).
17, Two types of reasons for non-enforcement of the law have been purposely ignored.
They are instances in which laws are not enforced because of criminal behavior on the
part of the enforcers, and reasons relating to the purely technical legal requirements of
statutes (i.e., the clarity of the terminology used in the statute, etc.). For a good
example of a summary of the type of technical reasons that exist so as to render a
statute unenforcible see, C. HowARD AND R. SUMMERS, LAw, ITS NATURE, FUNCTIONS, AND
LIMITS 46-47 (1965).
18. H. KALVEN, JR. AND H. ZEISAL, THE AMERICAN JURY 286-99 (1966).
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2. Law requires the support of the enforcers. If those required to
enforce the law cannot support it, they will look for alternative
means of conflict resolution (which may include ignoring the
fact that a law is being broken). Such intangibles as the pop-
ular support of the law breakers, the intensity of their defiance,
and the perceived justification of their cause probably play a
role here. If the enforcers of the law search for alternatives they
will probably not be able to admit to themselves that they are
doing so. They will rationalize their endeavors.
3. The sanctions for violating a law must be of such a nature that,
if invoked, they serve to render punishment, compliance, or
restitution which man can regard as "just." This is the prin-
ciple of desert as formulated by Cahn.
4. There can be a legal solution only to legal problems. A social
conflict is political, rather than legal, when the parties involved
are not willing to seek or abide by perceived legal solutions.
Since laws are the product of politics, if they prove dysfunc-
tional to the political system the gravitation is naturally back
to the political processor for a new workable legal solution.
What is workable at one point in time, may not be suitable in
others. This feedback process is one of the healthy means by
which laws are adapted to the environment.
5. Enforcement of the law must seem practical to the enforcers.
Enforcement, in other words, should create fewer problems
than non-enforcement. Enforcement may cause more problems
than it solves if it comes up against community norms. For
example, the authorities may be reluctant to break up an
illegal bing6 game conducted by a town's leading citizens
through a church or fraternal order. Practicality may also in-
volve a time dimension. In the early stages of a public dis-
order the authorities might decide that enforcement of the law
is feasible. However, once the disorder reaches riot propor-
tions, strict enforcement may not seem practical.
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